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By Sandra Ward  
Diane Ellis served as Deputy Director, Insurance and Research, at the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corp. during the financial crisis of 2007-09. The FDIC played a critical role in stabilizing 
financial conditions and establishing confidence in the financial markets by guaranteeing 
newly issued debt on a temporary basis for banks and thrifts as well as financial holding 
companies and eligible bank affiliates. The agency also fully guaranteed certain non-interest-
bearing transaction deposit accounts. Ellis played an important role in implementing the 
Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program that proved so critical in stemming the crisis. This 
“Lessons Learned” is based on a phone interview with Ms. Ellis. 
Although not the first agency to address the crisis, the FDIC played a critical role. 
In 2007, as the crisis began to unfold, Ellis recalls that the FDIC wasn’t much involved in the 
discussion of how best to handle what was happening and what could be done to stem a 
possible meltdown. Its bank examiners had begun to get drawn in—Bear Stearns held some 
depository institutions that required FDIC supervision, for instance—but it wasn’t until the 
failure of IndyMac in July 2008 that the crisis landed on the doorstep of the FDIC as it faced 
a major resolution problem. Recalls Ellis, 
We had a reasonably sized institution that we weren’t prepared to resolve. We had to 
put it in conservatorship for a while, and our resolution specialists were all occupied 
doing that. It was such a hit to our deposit insurance fund that our deposit insurance 
fund was getting close to insolvent. To me, that’s the event when the FDIC really got 
involved. 
Still, Ellis remembers, not until Columbus Day weekend 2008, after the historic collapse of 
Lehman Brothers and in the wake of numerous high-profile bank failures, did the Treasury 
and Federal Reserve turn to the FDIC about playing a role. The way that role evolved 
demonstrated some of the challenges of a major crisis when many parties are needed to 
implement a viable solution.  
The Treasury and the Federal Reserve were interested in accessing the FDIC’s systemic risk 
exception authority that would be required to provide the large-scale relief and debt 
guarantee programs that would ultimately boost confidence and stabilize the system. Ellis 
notes that the decision to implement a debt guarantee program was determined by outside 
agencies and, yet, left for the FDIC to manage.  
She remembers the pressure, 
Policymakers were saying “You’ve got to do this debt guarantee program. You have 
the authority to do this. This is what the U.S. needs. This is what the G7 countries 
already have. And if you don’t do it, then the collapse of capitalism will be your fault.” 
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It was thrust upon us. That’s when FDIC Chair Sheila Bair said, “If I’m going to do this, 
this is what I want: I want to limit the guarantee to only new debt, and I want the 
Transaction Account Guarantee [TAG],” and so on. 
According to Ellis, as a result of Bair’s diplomatic approach, the programs proved more 
palatable, eliminated political resistance from smaller banks, and were seen as critical to 
stabilizing the financial system. 
For federal regulatory programs to work best, seek industry input.  
The Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP), in which the FDIC agreed to guarantee 
the debt of financial institutions, was an elegant solution to unlock the debt markets and get 
credit flowing again, notes Ellis. Initially, however, the banks balked at participating, and the 
hesitancy puzzled regulators. The FDIC contacted industry participants to learn why they 
were reluctant to participate. Industry’s advice: act as a guarantor and stop acting as an 
insurer. And that required a restructuring of the design of the program. Says Ellis, 
That was a big leap for us internally because it was so different from the role we play 
in terms of providing deposit insurance. We heard we were treating the debt relief as 
if it were insurance and we were treating the incidence of default like a bank failure. 
A guarantor steps in and makes timely payments of principal and interest.  
Eventually, says Ellis, the program was structured as a true debt guarantee, in which timely 
payment of principal and interest are paid and the guarantee was backed ultimately by the 
U.S. government. Once the changes were made, banks responded quickly. “When we put that 
final rule in place, there was a big rush on the part of banks and holding companies to issue 
debt,” Ellis recalls. 
All bank problems wind up at the FDIC. 
The FDIC was formed and operates with a specific mandate. Prior to the 2007-09 crisis, the 
agency saw its domain as supervising and regulating insured depository institutions, says 
Ellis, and it viewed investment banks, so-called nonbanks, as a separate world to be 
monitored and followed but outside its bailiwick. That view changed completely once 
Lehman Brothers failed and the linkages between the banks and non-banks surfaced. 
Observes Ellis, 
Lehman seemed separate from us. Now, we realize, well, maybe it wasn’t quite as 
separate as we thought.  
At the time, the press would refer to investment banks as banks. Morgan Stanley was 
a bank; Goldman Sachs was a bank. They were not banks. Yet, as it turned out, they 
were all banks in substance. Without Lehman’s failure, I don’t think there would have 
been any Columbus Day weekend need to intervene and there would be no TLGP and 
so on. Maybe there would be no Dodd-Frank or certainly no Title I and Title II rule. 
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Ellis adds that one of the key lessons that the FDIC learned from the crisis was the 
interconnectedness of the whole financial system. She says that before the GFC, the FDIC 
pretty much lived in its world of insured depository institutions and thought that all the 
problems and risks were in the nonbanks. Afterwards, she says, “I gained an appreciation of 
how everything really comes back to the banks.” 
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